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(1) 
BRIEF OF JEFFREY D. KAHN AS AMICUS CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Jeffrey D. Kahn has been studying the No Fly List 
and the Terrorist Screening Center since 2006.1 He is the 
author, among other works on these topics, of Mrs. Ship-
ley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel and Terrorist Watch-
lists (University of Michigan Press, 2013). In 2013, he 
testified as an expert witness for the plaintiff in Ibrahim 
v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 06-0545 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013). He files this brief in support of respondents to 
clarify a misleading assertion petitioners make with re-
gard to the role FBI agents play in the watchlisting pro-
cess and to offer the Court relevant historical context 
regarding the creation and operation of the No Fly List. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Institutions are composed of people. To say an agen-
cy “does” something is to employ a synecdoche, substi-
tuting a legal abstraction for the human beings that do 
the actual work. Such shorthand, while common, ob-
scures the real decisionmakers and true sources of ac-
tion. 
Petitioners inject just such confusion when they as-
sert that “only relevant agencies, and not individual FBI 
agents, have the authority to determine the composition 
 
1  Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, Amicus states 
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part 
and that no person other than Amicus or his counsel made a mone-
tary contribution to its preparation or submission. Respondents 
filed their blanket consent to the filing of amici curiae briefs on 
January 28, 2020. Petitioner granted Amicus’s timely request for 
consent to the filing of this brief. 
2 
of the No Fly List.” Pet. 4.2 The world of terrorist watch-
lists, including the No Fly List, is one in which individual 
FBI agents have enjoyed substantial power but little 
oversight. That imbalance emerged alongside the crea-
tion of the No Fly List and grew with the apparatus de-
veloped to operate terrorist watchlists. These origins of 
the No Fly List inform an understanding of the powerful 
role that FBI agents play in its composition and some-
times misuse. 
ARGUMENT 
People, not institutions, act. Agencies are legal con-
structs, like sovereignty and liability: conceptual rather 
than tangible things. “[T]he sovereign can act only 
through agents,” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949), because the sover-
eign in our republic is an idea, not a person. The legal au-
thorities conferred on agencies are exercised by human 
beings.  
That distinction is essential when government 
agents are haled into court in their personal capacity 
(not merely as instrumentalities of the state) because 
“the real party in interest is the individual, not the sov-
ereign.” Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017). 
The Second Circuit recognized the logic behind this dis-
tinction: “An individual capacity suit that is confined to 
injunctive relief has limited value; official capacity suits 
for injunctive relief already supply injunctive relief 
against the governmental entity as a whole. … Thus, in-
dividual capacity suits tend to be associated with damag-
es remedies, and official capacity suits with injunctive re- 
2  Respondents note that they “have not conceded that individual 
agents play no role in the composition of the No Fly List or any 
other watchlist maintained by the TSC.” Br. in Opp. 4, n.4; see also 
Resp. Br. 5, n.2. 
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lief.” Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 464, n.9 (2nd Cir., 
2018). 
I. From the Start, FBI Agents Dominated the Process of 
Building the No Fly List 
There was nothing called a No Fly List prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Following the terrorist bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103 in 1988, officials at the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) developed and issued “security di-
rectives” to warn airlines not to carry persons believed 
to present a “specific and credible threat” to civil avia-
tion security. Report of the President’s Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism 78-79, 86-87 (1990); Jef-
frey Kahn, Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel 
and Terrorist Watchlists 133-34 (2013). These security 
directives were derived from prior authority granted to 
air carriers “to refuse transportation to a passenger or to 
refuse to transport property when, … such transporta-
tion would or might be inimical to safety of flight.” Act of 
Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 4, 75 Stat. 466, 467-
68.3  
Security directives were rare, limited by inter-
agency rivalries, and slow: they were transmitted on 
thermal fax paper. Jeffrey Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, 
in The Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law 75-76 
(Gray & Henderson eds., 2017). On Sept. 10, 2001, the 
FAA had identified twelve such individuals, none of 
whom were among the terrorists. 9/11 Commission Re-
port 83 (2004); Kahn (2017), at 76.  
This intelligence failure led Congress to establish 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 
November 2001, transfer to it the FAA’s responsibility 
for aviation security, and grant its Administrator “in  
3  In slightly revised form, this provision has been codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 44902(b).  
4 
consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies 
and air carriers,” authority to “establish policies and 
procedures requiring air carriers to use information 
from government agencies to identify individuals on pas-
senger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or na-
tional security.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(A). (The disjunc-
tive expanded the scope of this power, extending it to 
threats not involving aviation security at all.) That in-
formation, gleaned from other government agencies, 
could then be used to “notify appropriate law enforce-
ment agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an 
aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to 
that individual.” § 114(h)(3)(B). 
The security directive (“SD”) was the old FAA legal 
tool that new TSA officials seized upon to put this power 
into effect. According to Richard Falkenrath, who be-
came the Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior 
Director for Policy and Plans in the White House’s new 
Office of Homeland Security, this once neglected SD au-
thority attracted renewed attention from the White 
House and intelligence services: 
[I]t was just accidental that the authority originated 
in their authorizing statute, I assume, and then some 
pre-9/11 security directive. It was really grabbed a 
hold of by the White House, which was driving eve-
rything back then—FBI, CIA to a certain extent. 
And it just became, with every single case that came 
into the White House post-9/11, and there were lots, 
we got into the habit of just asking, Is he no-flied? Is 
he no-flied? Is he no-flied? 
Kahn (2013), at 139.4  
4  This approach was confirmed by the Deputy Secretary of 
Transportation at the time of the September 11 attacks, Michael 
Jackson, who later became Deputy Secretary of Homeland Securi- 
5 
Though TSA officials could now issue an SD to pro-
hibit a passenger from boarding a flight, FBI officials—
whose investigative tools and intelligence gathering ap-
paratus often provided the information needed to use 
it—took over the TSA’s new legal authority from the 
start. FBI agents began to use security directives the 
day after the September 11 attacks. According to an in-
ternal TSA memorandum by the Acting Associate Under 
Secretary at TSA for Transportation Security Intelli-
gence: 
[Early on September 12, 2001, A]t the request of the 
FBI, the FAA issued SD-108-01-06/EA 129-01-05, 
which included a list of individuals developed by the 
FBI as part of the Pentbom investigation. … The 
FBI “controlled,” both administratively and opera-
tionally, the contents of the list and added or re-
moved names in accordance with the Pentbom inves-
tigation. The FAA received the list from the FBI 
and disseminated it to air carriers, without any for-
mat or content changes. FAA, in essence acted as a 
conduit for the dissemination of their “watchlist.”5  
Kahn (2013), at 140 (quoting TSA Memorandum on “TSA 
Watchlists” dated Oct. 16, 2002, from Claudio Manno, 
Acting Associate Under Secretary for Transportation 
Security Intelligence to Associate Under Secretary for 
Security Regulation and Policy).  
As a result, FBI agents developed a proprietary at-
titude toward the emerging No Fly List, as e-mails re-
leased through FOIA litigation reveal. “We are putting 
the target on the TSA No Fly List here at FBIHQ” one 
FBI Supervisory Special Agent wrote on December 17,  
ty. Kahn, 296, n.105 (noting that when TSA promulgated the No 
Fly List, “it was done through security directives”). 
5  Pentbom was the code name for the FBI’s investigation into 
the 9/11 attacks. 
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2002. “I will be getting with TSA tomorrow (12/18) to ac-
complish this.” Kahn (2013), at 140.6 “We’ve got a guy we 
want to no-fly,” another FBI e-mail states. “Do you have 
a copy of the last one we gave you?” Id. The attitude at 
FBI Headquarters was mirrored by agents in the field. 
“Boston has subject that we would like to add to the TSA 
‘No Fly List,’” an October 2002 e-mail states. “Do you 
know who I address the EC [electronic communication] 
to?” Id. 
The story behind these internal communications was 
summarized by Edward Alden: “The process for vetting 
the names on the terrorist list was far too lax, such that 
almost any FBI agent could add a name to the list with 
little scrutiny.” Edward Alden, The Closing of the Amer-
ican Border 241 (2008).  
II. The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center Consolidated 
the Central Role of the FBI and its Agents in the 
Watchlisting Process with Low Criteria and 
Standards for Oversight 
As TSA developed its bureaucracy and administra-
tive resources, a turf war threatened to break out over 
the No Fly List. Randy Beardsworth, a distinguished 
Coast Guard officer who joined DHS in 2003 as the Chief 
Operations Officer for Border and Transportation Secu-
rity observed: 
And part of the situation was that FBI is feudal. … 
Each SAC [special agent in charge] is completely in-
dependent and powerful. So the SAC in one city will 
look at cases and information a certain way. They 
don’t want to share information, and put it into a 
system that everyone has access to: their sources 
and methods, investigations, and grand jury infor- 
6  These e-mails were released as a result of successful FOIA liti-
gation by the American Civil Liberties Union, Gordon v. FBI, 390 
F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  
7 
mation. TSA comes in as the new kid, very little 
knowledge of law enforcement, trying to administer 
a list. And so there’s this natural tension between 
the two of them. 
Kahn (2013), at 142.  
The interagency rivalries developing both between 
FBI and TSA and with other agencies were resolved by 
Homeland Presidential Security Directive Six (HSPD-6), 
which President Bush signed in September 2003. That 
directive ordered that the “Attorney General shall estab-
lish an organization to consolidate the Government’s ap-
proach to terrorism screening and provide for the ap-
propriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in 
screening processes.” HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003) at ¶ 1. 
The FBI’s consolidation of control over watchlisting be-
gan at that point.  
On the basis of this directive and an accompanying 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed on the 
same day as HSPD-6 by the Attorney General, Director 
of Central Intelligence, and Secretaries of State and 
Homeland Security, Attorney General Ashcroft estab-
lished the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) as a multi-
agency unit housed within the FBI. William J. Krouse, 
Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Un-
der Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, CRS 
Report for Congress 2 (Apr. 21, 2004).7 The TSC would 
maintain a consolidated Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB) from which other watchlists (such as the No Fly 
List) would be created for use by customer agencies 
(such as TSA). The TSC would also establish and admin-
ister standardized criteria and formats for information  
7  An addendum to the MOU was signed in 2006 by the original 
signatories and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense, Di-
rector of National Intelligence, Director of the National Counter-
terrorism Center, and Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. 
8 
on these lists. Memorandum of Understanding on the In-
tegration and Use of Screening Information to Protect 
Against Terrorism ¶¶ 4 & 29 (Sept. 16, 2003). The TSC’s 
keystone role was depicted graphically by TSC Director 
Timothy Healy in the following slide: 
  
9 
The TSC would be the central authority for the crea-
tion and curation of terrorist watchlists used by federal 
agencies, state and local law enforcement, and even for-
eign partners. Its staff would gather information from 
the FBI (for domestic terrorism) and from the National 
Counterterrorism Center (for international terrorism). 
That information would be assessed by standardized cri-
teria to add individual identities to the main repository 
(the TSDB) and, from that source, the TSC staff would 
also derive downstream lists for customer agencies (such 
as the No Fly List for the TSA). The TSC called this the 
“nomination” process. 
What is more, the MOU established the FBI’s con-
trol over the TSC. It required that the TSC Director 
would report to the Attorney General through the Direc-
tor of the FBI and be appointed by the Attorney General 
in consultation with the other signatories and the FBI 
Director. MOU ¶ 5. This was a substantial acquisition. In 
its first year of operation (FY 2004), the TSC grew to a 
$27 million budget and roughly 177-person staff. U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of the Terrorist Screening Center 1, 35 (2005). 
Tellingly, only eight positions were created and filled 
with representatives of the TSA in 2005; the bulk of all 
staff came from the FBI. Id. at 35 & 109. 
The criteria that the TSC established for both the 
TSDB and the No Fly List that drew from it, as well as 
the standard of review to determine if such criteria were 
and continued to be met, were then and are now very 
low. In its first review of the TSC, the Justice Depart-
ment’s Inspector General determined that “the TSC pro-
cess for including a name in the TSDB was more of an 
acceptance than nomination. TSC staff did not review 
the majority of the records submitted unless an auto-
mated error occurred while the records were uploaded to 
10 
the database.” OIG (2005), at 42. The first TSC Director, 
Donna Bucella, candidly explained that: 
[T]o err on the side of caution, individuals with any 
degree of a terrorism nexus were included on the 
consolidated watch list, as long as minimum criteria 
was met (i.e., the person’s name was partially known 
plus one other piece of identifying information, such 
as the date of birth). The Director further explained 
that one of the benefits of watch listing individuals 
who pose a lower threat was that their movement 
could be monitored through the screening process 
and thereby provide useful intelligence information 
to counterterrorism investigators. 
OIG (2005), at viii-ix.  
At this stage of its development, entry into the 
TSC’s system was a one-way road. Even two years later, 
a follow-up inspection by the Inspector General’s Office 
found that “[d]espite being responsible for removing 
outdated or obsolete data from the TSDB, however, the 
TSC did not have a process for regularly reviewing the 
contents of the TSDB to ensure that the database does 
not include records that do not belong on the watchlists.” 
U.S. Department of Justice, Follow-Up Audit of the Ter-
rorist Screening Center 18 (2007). 
This virtually non-existent oversight allowed FBI 
agents virtually unfettered ability to add individuals of 
interest to their investigations to various watchlists. 
Mirroring Beardsworth’s above-noted view that the FBI 
was a “feudal” organization with regionally placed agents 
who were “completely independent and powerful,” Ed-
ward Alden reached a similar conclusion in watchlisting 
terms: “The FBI is virtually a franchise operation, with 
local agents running their own cases, and initially there 
was no oversight of how these agents added names to the 
watch lists.” Alden, at 241. As a result, both the TSDB 
and the No Fly List ballooned in size. 
11 
Facing both OIG audits and growing litigation pres-
sure, multi-agency working groups and other bodies 
were routinely organized to develop what became known 
as “watchlisting guidance”: sharper standards, criteria, 
and processes for evaluating nominations. But the stand-
ard that gradually emerged—the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard—was no real constraint.8 It was inspired by the 
test of the same name presented in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), though with no intention by the working 
group convened to craft it that a neutral magistrate out-
side the TSC should ever evaluate its application to a 
watchlisting decision. Kahn (2013), at 170.  
The standard has hardly proved to be a constraining 
one. It is applied to broad definitions of “known” or 
“suspected” terrorists that satisfied eligibility for inclu-
sion in the TSDB. Thus, according to the most recent 
publicly available watchlisting guidance, from 2013,9 an 
FBI agent nominating an individual to the TSDB must  
8  Statement of Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening 
Center, Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs Committee, Dec. 9, 2009, at 2 (“Reasonable sus-
picion requires ‘articulable’ facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences, reasonably warrant a determination that an indi-
vidual is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to terrorism 
and terrorist activities, and is based on the totality of the circum-
stances. Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences 
that a person can draw from the facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate 
‘hunches’ are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion.”). 
9  The March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance is an unclassified but 
“for official use only/sensitive security information” document that 
was published in 2014 by The Intercept, a blog operated by the in-
vestigative journalist Glenn Greenwald. Jeremy Scahill & Ryan 
Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret Government Rulebook for La-
beling You a Terrorist, The Intercept, July 23, 2014, available at 
https://theintercept.com/2014/07/23/blacklisted/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2020). 
12 
provide information that a person identified by adequate 
biometric or biographic information is at least a “sus-
pected terrorist,” i.e., “reasonably suspected to be, or 
has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation 
for, in aid of, or related to Terrorism and or Terrorist 
Activities.” March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance § 1.24 & 
App. 1(W). Terrorist Activities are defined to include 
non-violent, facilitative or supporting activities “such as 
providing a safe house, transportation, communications, 
funds, transfer of funds or other material benefit, … .” 
Id. at § 1.15. And the standard that must be met to con-
clude that these are indeed invidious rather than harm-
less or unknowing actions is itself only “reasonable sus-
picion” that such information is correct. Id. § 1.24.2 & 
App. 1(U). In the words of one federal judge assessing 
this approach, “In other words, an American citizen can 
find himself labeled a suspected terrorist because of a 
‘reasonable suspicion’ based on a ‘reasonable suspicion’.” 
Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531-32 (E.D. 
Va. 2014).  
It turns out that this standard is used to review both 
the criteria for inclusion in the TSDB as well as for the 
No Fly List. Kahn (2013), at 168-69; Declaration of G. 
Clayton Grigg, Deputy Director for Operations, Terror-
ist Screening Center, May 28, 2015, Tarhuni v. Lynch, 
No. 3:13-cv-1 (D. Or. Sept. 1, 2015) (Docket No. 105-A). 
The criteria for the No Fly List are similarly expansive. 
A person may be added to the No Fly List if there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the person “represents a 
threat” of committing various definitions of terrorism 
found in the U.S. Code.10 March 2013 Watchlisting Guid-
ance § 4.5.   
10  Although for many years Government counsel represented in 
No Fly List litigation that publication of these criteria would  
13 
A person may also be added if the person is reason-
ably suspected of being “operationally capable” of “en-
gaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism” with-
out any particular target of terrorism. March 2013 
Watchlisting Guidance, at § 4.5. “Operationally capable” 
is also a specially defined term. The Watchlisting Guid-
ance indicates that the reasonable suspicion standard 
could be met “depending on the circumstances, and in 
combination with other facts,” by evidence of “traveling 
for no legitimate purpose to places that have terrorist 
training grounds, regardless of whether the person is 
presently capable” of using a dangerous weapon. Id. 
§ 4.8.2. Guidance on what is the relevant geographic 
scope of “places” and what constitutes a basis for dis-
cerning what is a “legitimate” purpose for travel is not 
provided.  
Notwithstanding these broad criteria and low stand-
ards, the Watchlisting Guidance includes exceptions to 
the standard procedures. Thus, for example, a nominator 
may use an “expedited” procedure for individual nomina-
tions in “exigent circumstances” (an undefined term) by 
calling a toll free telephone number after normal duty 
hours to “telephonically complete a Terrorist Screening 
Center Expedited Nomination Request Form” and fol-
low up within 72 hours with documentation providing the 
basis for watchlisting. See March 2013 Watchlisting 
Guidance §§ 1.58.3-1.58.4. 
It should be unsurprising, therefore, that most nom-
inations are successful. Thus, for example, the table be-
low shows nominations and rejected nominations to the 
Terrorist Screening Database between fiscal years 2009 
and 2013. It was produced by Government counsel in lit-
igation alleging that unknown TSC agents had placed  
threaten national security, they are now publicly acknowledged. 
See Tarhuni v. Lynch, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1055 (D. Or. 2015). 
14 
the plaintiff on the No Fly List following his interroga-
tion abroad by FBI agents seeking to pressure him to 
become an informant.11 
FY NOMINATIONS REJECTED 
2009 227,932 508 
2010 250,847 1628 
2011 274,470 2776 
2012 336,712 4356 
2013 468,749 4915 
As the Government’s table reveals, nominations to 
the TSDB more than doubled in this five-year period, 
while the percentage of rejected nominations rose from 
slightly more than 0.2 percent in 2009 to only slightly 
more than one percent in 2013. 
III. The Combination of Substantial Control and Low 
Oversight Invites Error and Misuse 
Neither the TSC in generating the Terrorist Screen-
ing Database and No Fly List, nor the TSA in operation-
alizing the latter, are responsible for verifying the infor-
mation supplied by the FBI agent or other nominating  
11 Defendants’ Objections and Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set 
of Interrogatories, Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-00050-AJT-
TRJ (E.D. Va. March 28, 2014) (Docket No. 91-3). See also id., 
Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (“Defendants placed Mr. Mohamed on its 
No Fly List while he was abroad in order to pressure him to forgo 
his right to counsel, submit to invasive questioning, and become an 
informant for the FBI upon returning to the United States.”), id. 
¶¶ 49-54 (alleging conduct by unnamed FBI agents) (Docket No. 
85). Tellingly, the Government’s Answer to this allegation was 
careful to disavow responsibility for watchlisting by DHS officials, 
answering in part: “DHS Defendants deny that they make final 
decisions regarding the placement of individuals, including Mr. 
Mohamed, on the No Fly List.” See id., Answer ¶ 2 (Docket No. 
88). 
15 
official that supplies it. The March 2013 Watchlisting 
Guidance puts that responsibility squarely on the shoul-
ders of the originator of the nomination itself: 
Nominating Agencies should implement processes 
designed to ensure that nominations are free from 
errors, that recalled or revised information is re-
viewed regularly, and that necessary corrections to 
nominations based on those revisions/retractions are 
made. Nominating Agencies should, to the extent 
possible given the nature of the reporting, verify the 
accuracy and reliability of the information included 
in nominations. 
March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance § 1.24.2. Thus, if an 
FBI agent submits a nomination form to the TSC to re-
quest that an individual be placed on the TSDB and the 
No Fly List, the information on the form is assessed as 
is.  
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 3:06-cv-
0545 (N.D. Cal. 2013), the only No Fly List case to re-
ceive a trial in federal court, provides concrete evidence 
of the effect of such low oversight and review, and the 
vigorous efforts made to shield agents from accountabil-
ity outside of the FBI, of which the TSC is a part.12 
Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim, a Malaysian citizen, Muslim, 
and prominent professor of architecture, was a graduate 
student at Stanford University when she was unexpect-
edly approached by FBI Special Agent Kevin Michael 
Kelley. The Government conceded at trial that Dr. Ibra-
him did not at that time, nor at any other time, present 
any threat of domestic terrorism or any other threat to 
civil aviation security or national security. Ibrahim v. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security, 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 915-916  
12 Prof. Kahn testified as an expert witness on these topics on be-
half of the plaintiff in Ibrahim. 
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(N.D. Cal. 2014). In December 2004, Agent Kelley and a 
colleague interviewed Dr. Ibrahim at length, including 
about her involvement in the Muslim community. Ibra-
him, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 916-917.  
A month prior to meeting her, in November 2004, 
Agent Kelley, then in San Jose, California, nominated 
Dr. Ibrahim to several terrorist watchlists including the 
No Fly List. He did this through a written form. Agent 
Kelly admitted at trial that he misunderstood the in-
structions on the form and nominated Dr. Ibrahim to the 
No Fly List and other watchlists completely by mistake. 
According to the district court, Agent Kelley “checked 
the wrong boxes, filling out the form exactly the opposite 
way from the instructions on the form.” The district 
court copied an excerpt from this form to its opinion, 
finding it to be the “bureaucratic analogy to a surgeon 
amputating the wrong digit.” Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 
928.  
As a result of this error, when Dr. Ibrahim attempt-
ed to fly to an academic conference from San Francisco 
International Airport, she was placed in handcuffs, es-
corted to a jail cell (though Dr. Ibrahim needed a wheel-
chair at the time) and humiliated in front of her fourteen-
year-old daughter, after which her student visa was re-
voked and she was forbidden to return to the United 
States. Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 917. The district court 
found that due to Agent Kelley’s mistake in submitting 
information to the TSDB, “it can propagate extensively 
through the government’s interlocking complex of data-
bases, like a bad credit report that will never go away.” 
Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 928.  
It is telling that Agent Kelley did not realize his mis-
take for eight years—so much for oversight. The error 
was not caught by either the FBI agent himself, TSC of-
ficials mechanically inputting his information, or TSA of-
ficials when the form was submitted in November 2004. 
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One can only wonder what vetting process could confirm 
Dr. Ibrahim on multiple watchlists that were not only 
negligently requested by this FBI agent but also when 
(as the court found and the Government conceded) Dr. 
Ibrahim was at no time a threat of any kind. Neither 
routine nor ad hoc oversight procedures caught the er-
ror. Only at Agent Kelley’s September 2013 deposition, 
which was permitted to proceed only after vigorous ob-
jections by government counsel, did Agent Kelley realize 
his monumental blunder. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Home-
land Security, 912 F.3d 1147, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2019) (en 
banc).  
And yet, the Government (knowing this blunder and 
knowing Ibrahim’s innocence) forced the case to trial. 
The District Court, considering a request under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act, concluded that both the 
Government’s pre-litigation conduct (“The original sin—
Agent Kelley’s mistake and that he did not learn about 
his error until his deposition eight years later—was not 
reasonable.”) and the Government’s litigation conduct 
(“[T]he government’s attempt to defend its no-fly error 
for years was not reasonable.”) defending such inade-
quate due process “was not substantially justified.” Ib-
rahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 2014 WL 1493561 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014). Indeed, the Court of Ap-
peals, sitting en banc, observed:  
In sum, the government failed to reveal that Dr. Ib-
rahim’s placement on the No Fly list was a mistake 
until two months before trial, and eight years after 
Dr. Ibrahim filed suit. And at all times, as the gov-
ernment vigorously contested Dr. Ibrahim’s discov-
ery requests, and lodged over two hundred objec-
tions and instructions not to answer questions in 
depositions, the government was aware that she was 
not responsible for terrorism or any threats against 
the United States. 
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Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 912 F.3d at 
1162-63 (internal footnotes omitted). 
The nature of the form Agent Kelley blundered is 
also indicative of the nature of the watchlisting enter-
prise itself. A blank copy of this form appears below.13 
The form presented a list of watchlists with the pre-
sumption that a nomination would be made to all of 
them. The form instructed the FBI agent to positively 
opt out of those watchlists that the FBI agent did not 
recommend his subject be added to. Such a construction 
is entirely to be expected given the culture that prevailed 
at the FBI and the TSC. As the former Chief Operations 
Officer for Border and Transportation Security at the 
Department of Homeland Security observed, “[R]emem-
ber, it’s not a centralized, single FBI. But you would 
have cases of agents who would say, ‘I don’t know, I’m 
not going to be the one that lets somebody in the coun-
try. This goes on the No Fly List.’ But there was nobody  
13 Both the District Court, Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 916, and 
the Court of Appeals, Ibrahim, 912 F.3d at 1158, reproduced cop-
ies of Agent Kelley’s erroneously completed version of it. The 
Court of Appeals also reproduced a blank copy, Ibrahim, 912 F.3d 
1157, which is the source for this image. 
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who was adjudicating the No Fly List.” Kahn (2013), at 
142. 
IV. The Working Environment of the Terrorist Screening 
Center Reinforces Deference to the Real 
Decisionmakers 
The Terrorist Screening Center does not accept re-
dress inquiries directly from the public.14 The FBI has 
not disclosed the physical location of the TSC, which was 
only revealed by accident to be in Vienna, Virginia. Tom 
Jackman, Vienna Tormented by FBI Building’s Non- 
Stop Buzz, Wash. Post, June 21, 2012. Although the 
building lacks any visible signs, newspaper accounts can 
now be confirmed using Google Maps because its former 
Director dramatically revealed during an interview on 
CNN that its employee entrance is ornamented with a 
three-story tall sculpture taken from the rubble of the 
World Trade Center’s North Tower. Exclusive Inter-
view with Terrorist Screening Center Director Christo-
pher Piehota, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016).15 The interview began 
by highlighting the sculpture. 
  
 
14 Available at https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-
structure/national-security-branch/tsc (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
15 Available at http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/04/06/ 
exclusive-interview-with-terrorist-screening-center-director-
christopher-piehota-origwx-allee.cnn (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
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But as this image from Google Maps better illus-
trates, the sculpture is placed so that employees must 
file past it each morning on their way from the secure 
parking lot to the building entrance. 
This sobering opportunity for reflection at the start 
of the work day was not accidental. In his interview, TSC 
Director Christopher Piehota explained the purpose of 
this sculpture to his CNN interviewer: “It reminds us 
21 
daily of the importance of what we do. The threat is ever 
present.” Id. at 00:11-00:21.  
Nor was the sculpture the only reminder. Once in-
side the building, these reminders continue. CBS News 
reported that “Throughout the Terrorist Screening Cen-
ter are placed artifacts from various terrorist attacks in-
cluding Oklahoma City federal building, the USS Cole 
bombing, and the World Trade Centers. All sober re-
minders of how important their work is.” Bob Orr, In-
side a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS 
Evening News, Oct. 1, 2012, 9:03 PM, available at 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-a-secret-us-
terrorist-screening-center/.  
Four years later in his 2016 interview, Director 
Piehota escorted his CNN interviewer through this ma-
cabre museum and allowed the images his staff sees each 
morning to be shown on CNN. Again, his message was 
very clear, as he somberly observed standing in front of 
another piece of the wreckage from the World Trade 
Center: “And the remnants were put here to remind our 
staff of our mission, which is to prevent acts of terrorism. 
Keeps us mindful of the threat that is still out there. 
Each remnant or each artifact shows you the evolution of 







Since this building is not accessible to the public, 
this museum’s purpose is not to educate anyone who 
does not work at the TSC. Tellingly, none of the exhibits 
shown in this interview concerned the successful use of 
the No Fly List or other terrorist watchlists to prevent 
acts of terrorism. Some exhibits predated the existence 
of the TSC.16 Others, like the “Underwear Bomber” on 
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009, 
were demonstrations of the failure of the TSC to use its 
watchlisting tools effectively.  
The message to the employees passing these arti-
facts of intelligence failures therefore seems clear: Do 
not err on the side of caution; Do not interrogate too rig-
orously the judgments of the FBI agents who send you 
names of people to be watchlisted. There will be no re-
ward (and there is too much at risk) to question their 
reasons for adding (let alone for deciding to remove) 
someone who has been placed on the watchlist. The rea- 
16  In addition to these exhibits, the FBI has posted a time-lapse 
video that shows individuals (who most likely are TSC employees, 
given the guarded nature of the facility) at prayer or somber re-
flection as shadows cast by three flagpoles that once stood in front 
of the World Trade Center pass over a 9/11 memorial placed at one 
of the security gates to the TSC building. The memorial is de-
signed so that these shadows cross the memorial once each year at 
the precise times of the crashes of the four hijacked planes. See 
FBI, Video: 9/11 Memorial at Terrorist Screening Center, 
https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/160906-terrorist-screening-
center-sept11-memorial.mp4/view. There is no doubt that those 
paying their respects are sincere. And no doubt that the sculpture 
and artifacts are vivid reminders of threats to our national security 
that TSC and other government officials diligently and dutifully 
seek to prevent. But these monuments to vigilance in no way cre-
ate the presence of mind needed for dispassionate evaluation of ev-
idence that could be compared to that found in a courthouse whose 
employees pass by a statue of blindfolded Lady Justice. Each insti-
tution seeks to sculpt the attitude it wishes to instill in those that 
enter its buildings. 
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sonable suspicion standard is meant to accord deference 
to FBI agents, not to provide an independent, neutral 
assessment of their claims. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding this case, the Court should recognize the 
actual role that FBI agents play in the watchlisting pro-
cess. Referring to an agency’s legal authority, as if this 
abstraction were in fact capable of acting on its own, ob-
scures the reality that an agency is composed of the peo-
ple who work there.  
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